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Abstract - When renegotiation under incomplete contracts follows the outside option principle, hold-up may occur 
as the ex-post degree of competition increases on investor’s side. However, under this framework, asset specificity 
may play the counterintuitive role of an entry deterrence device, thus decreasing the probability of hold-up. Our result 
contrasts with standard literature in three respects: i) an equilibrium with overinvestment may emerge; ii) the 
'intimidating effect' of overinvestment acts as an endogenous enforcement device; iii) a pervasive trade-off may emerge 
between ex-post efficient entry and ex-ante efficient speciﬁc investments.  
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1. Introduction  
 
Irreversible investments play two opposite roles in two different streams 
of  literature: while the literature on incomplete contracts depicts 
irreversible investments as the source of  vulnerability against 
counterparty’s post-contractual power (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 
1978; Williamson, 1985), the literature on strategic entry deterrence 
outlines the conditions under which long-term monopolistic rents might 
be sustained by irreversible investments (Spence, 1977; Dixit, 1980).  
 
In this paper we show that specific investments, by deterring 
entry, may endogenously enforce incomplete contracts. We focus on an 
incomplete contract framework with one-sided speciﬁc investment by 
seller and potential entry on seller’s side. Our intuition is that, under 
given conditions, entrant’s payoffs are adversely affected by the specificity 
degree of  the investment made by the incumbent seller. Then the 
incumbent seller might have a strong incentive to overinvest in 
speciﬁcity, with the purpose of  deterring entry. In this setting, breach 
penalties and specific over-investment are strategic substitutes. 
 
 
2. The Model 
Let us consider a simple contract  A, between a group of buyers B and a 




For simplicity’s sake, let us assume that the group of buyers acts as a 
unique agent, bargaining one standard contract with the seller.  
 
(i)  Let us assume that demand is given by  pq ( )=1−q, where q is 
the quantity of the widget delivered. Under bilateral monopoly, 
seller’s payoff is given by Π = 1−q−c1 ( )q where c1 = c − x1 represents 
the production costs.  
 
(ii)  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  w e  c o n s i d e r  t h e  c a s e  o f  a n  i n v e s t m e n t   x1 
with  x1 ∈ R








<0. We assume this investment is speciﬁc 
or irreversible in alternative uses, thus it takes the form of a sunk 
investment given by  fx 1 ( )= x1 ( )
2.  
 
(iii)  The contract is incomplete, which means its agreed terms 
(price and investments) are observable but unverifiable. Let us 
assume that only the seller can make speciﬁc self-investments.  
 
(iv)  Moreover, we assume that c1 0 ( )< P where P is the buyer’s 
commonly known reserve price, namely trade is always efficient  
and that ∃x1 > 0:c1 x1 () < P, in other words, an efficient trade with 
speciﬁc investment exists.  
 
(v)  Contractual timeline is as follows: at the starting date of 
the contract, t =0, agents meet and agree on price and 
investments through a contract  A = p;x ( ). At t =1, investment 






We assume that entry occurs at t = 2, and that the entrant (seller 
2) maintains identical production costs of seller 1, with c2 = c − x2 
and  x2 being the level of investment for new entrant, as defined 
for the incumbent. Entrant has to pay F>0 fixed costs and entry 
generates a Cournot equilibrium on seller’s side. When the 
buyer’s outside option turns to be binding ex post, the buyer may 
purchase at the new price from the original seller or she can split 
her demand - as in a Cournot-like case - at the new price between 
the old and the new seller.The outside option principle applies1 
                                                 
1 See Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1989), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990).  
and the renegotiation game takes the form of an infinitely 
repeated bargaining game with alternate offers (Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1990) and buyer’s outside option, where first proposer 
is the seller and the first responder is the buyer2.  
 
 
(B) Hold Up by Competition without Entry Costs 
 
Under the above assumptions, hold-up occurs when buyer turns to have a 
binding outside option.  Let consider first the case where entrant’s fixed 
costs are zero (F=0). 
 
Proposition 1  
When entry occurs at t=2, buyer’s renegotiation leads to hold up. Anticipating 
this, the seller will underinvest at t =1. 
 
Proof. 
By assumption, after entry, a Cournot duopoly occurs. Thus sellers’ 
payoffs are given by Πi
C = 1−qi −q j −ci ( )qi,  ∀ i, j =1,2 with i ≠ j. If entry 
does not occur, seller 1 obtains ex-post monopoly profit given by 
                                                 
2 We assume that buyer accepts any proposal which provides her with ex post outside options plus a 
small enough amount  . As shown by Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), given that the seller will 
propose to the buyer the highest value between the price agreed upon and buyer’s outside option, 
parties will reach an immediate Nash equilibrium which gives parties either the surplus sharing 
agreed upon or the one resulting from giving the buyer her binding outside option.  
x1








1−c + 2x1 − x2 ()
9
<Π=
1−c + x1 ( )
2
4





(C) Over-investment with Positive Entry Costs 
 
Let us now focus on the case of an entrant facing positive fixed costs 
F >0. Then we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2  
With positive fixed entry costs, the incumbent may strategically increase the 
degree of specific investment with the purpose of  to deterring entry.  
 
Proof. 
With positive fixed entry costs, entrant’s profits will be given by 
Π2
C =
1−2c2 + c1 ()
9
− F − x2 ()
2 =
1−c + 2x2 − x1 ()
2
9
− F − x2 ()
2. Thus. seller 2’s 
profits are negatively correlated with seller 1’s investment levels and 
with entry costs. Entry is deterred if investment level is selected at t =1 
by seller 1 such as to determine negative profits for the new entrant.  
This level is equal to  x1
OD ≥1−c + 2x2 − 3 F + x2 ()
2  (the apex OD stands for 
optimal deterrence level). Then we have the following cases: 
a) if  x1
UI ≥ x1
OD, entry is deterred even if incumbent underinvests; 
b) if  x1
UI < x1
OD < x*, the incumbent will select the optimal level of 
investment for deterring entry; 
c) if  x1
UI = x1
OD > x*,  in order to deter entry, seller 1 will over-invest as 
long as Π1
M x1
OD () ≥Π 1
C x1




Proposition 2 shows how, under certain conditions, efficient 
specific investments may also deter entry when  x1
UI < x1
OD < x*. This is 
quite a novel result with respect to standard hold-up theory, since the 
degree of asset specificity actually reduces rather than increases the 
probability of hold-up. In particular, the higher the level of barrier entry 




(D) The Countervailing Effect of Breach Penalties 
 
Let us now assume that parties may contract breach penalties on 
observable exit (Aghion and Bolton, 1987; Spier and Whinston, 1995). 
Depending on the level of entry costs, breach penalties may play a  
countervailing effect on seller 1 ‘s strategic choice to over-invest. Assume 
that a breach penalty like  p
A should be paid by buyer upon exit. As in 
Aghion and Bolton (1987), this breach penalty has the immediate effect of 




1−2c2 + c1 ()
2
9
− F − x2 ()
2 − λp
A =
1−c + 2x2 − x1 ( )
2
9
− F − x2 ()
2 − λp
A, 
where  λ is the portion of the breach penalty paid by seller 2, with 
0 < λ ≤1. Then, we have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3  
The higher is the breach penalty, the lower is the level of strategic specific 
investments needed to deter entry, and vice versa. 
 
Proof. 
It is sufficient to notice that under breach penalties the threshold value of 
strategic deterring investment is  given by 
x1
OD =1−c +2x2 −3 F + x2 ()
2 + λp
A . In particular, the modification of 
strategic investments due to presence of breach penalties is equal to 
3 F + x2 ()




⎜  ⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ . Since this value turns out to be negative, 




Proposition 3 outlines another important result: under our framework, 
breach penalties and specific (over)investment are strategic substitutes. 
This is a counterintuitive conclusion, since the literature stresses the 
opposite (Spier and Whinston, 1995; Chung, 1998). Moreover, this result 
suggests that breach penalties might increase overall efficiency by 





Our results reverse some of the main conclusions of standard hold-up 
theories: we obtain an overinvestment rather than an underinvestment 
equilibrium; overinvestment acts as an enforcement device against hold-
up. Moreover, efficient breach penalty restores incentives to invest 
efficiently with respect not only to underinvestment but also to 
overinvestment decisions. Absent breach penalties, when entry 
deterrence would be reached in any case through incumbent’s 
overinvestment, breach penalties may reduce to some extent the 
inefficiency associated to overinvestment.  
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